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ARE BEACH BOUNDARIES ENFORCEABLE?  
REAL-TIME LOCATIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND THE 
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
Josh Eagle* 
Abstract: Over the past few decades, landowners have tried to use the First, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendments to fully privatize the upper, dry-sand part of the beach. If these efforts 
were to succeed, there would be a host of negative consequences, and not just for surfers. In 
most states in which beaches are economically important, including California, Florida, New 
Jersey and Texas, privatized dry sand would have a significant impact on public access. 
This Article explores the possibility that courts and the public can put an end to the beach 
privatization movement simply by pointing to the common law of waterfront property. 
Historically, both courts and scholars have largely ignored the challenging title issues created 
by the common law and, in particular, by the rules governing boundary relocation after 
waves, currents, tides, and winds have changed the shape of a beach. These rules serve 
important purposes, but also make it impossible to know the location of public-private beach 
boundaries in real time, that is, at the moment the landowner wishes to use the boundary to 
exclude others from her property. The consequence of this real-time uncertainty is that, as a 
matter of law, landowners do not have an enforceable right to exclude. The absence of a right 
to exclude not only undercuts constitutional claims premised on its existence, but also leads 
to the conclusion that the public has the right to use the entire beach. 
If there is no right to exclude, what are the beachfront owner’s rights? Real-time 
uncertainty makes it impossible for the owner to prove title in real time, but the same would 
also be true for the state; thus the state and neighboring owners enjoy a form of co-tenancy in 
the sand. To protect the private interest, and to fill the vacuum left by the vanished right to 
exclude, this Article suggests that the state should grant landowners a more stable exclusion 
line, at the top of the beach, and give each landowner the right to prevent unreasonable public 
use of adjacent beach areas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Oceanfront property owners often quarrel with beachgoers and the 
government over the public’s right to use the beach.1 Lawsuits arising 
out of these conflicts take one of two forms. In some instances, 
                                                     
1. Section III.B describes cases from the past half-century, including some that have been 
decided at the U.S. Supreme Court, that evidence public-private tensions over dry-sand access. 
Such cases are not limited to the last fifty years: the oldest reported opinion on beach conflict 
appears to be in the English case of Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1190; 5 B. & 
Ald. 268, 268 (1821) (The stated claim was “[t]respass, for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s 
close, [ ] describing it, first, as a close called the Sea-Shore, within the manor of Great Crosby; 
secondly, as a close between the high-water mark and the low-water mark of the River 
Mersey . . . .”). While this Article focuses on sandy beaches, the same issues can also arise along the 
shores of lakes and rivers. 
For recent examples of beach conflict in the news, see Dugan Arnett, Beneath Picturesque 
Surface, a Neighborhood at War, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 7, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/style/2017/10/07/beneath-picturesque-surface-
neighborhood-war/jSMHJ6I6OWlg9wd5Wy44PL/story.html [https://perma.cc/W6GD-PLRC]; 
Shelby Danielsen, Debate Heats up over Public Beach Access Along Private Property in Florida, 
FIRSTCOAST NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018, 7:39 AM), 
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/beaches/debate-heats-up-over-public-beach-
access-along-private-property-in-florida/77-507298799 [https://perma.cc/L6JH-EZSQ]; Christopher 
Dunagan, The Legal Dilemma of Beach Walking, KITSAP SUN (July 5, 2010), 
http://archive.kitsapsun.com/news/local/the-legal-dilemma-of-beach-walking-ep-419637973-
357591681.html [https://perma.cc/WW8L-VW6K]; Timothy Egan, Owners of Malibu Mansions 
Cry, This Sand Is My Sand, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 25, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/us/owners-of-malibu-mansions-cry-this-sand-is-my-
sand.html [https://perma.cc/ZE59-UDMZ]; Russ Lay, Lawyer for Emerald Isle Couple Lays out 
Case in Beach Dispute, OUTER BANKS VOICE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://outer 
banksvoice.com/2016/09/14/lawyer-for-emerald-isle-couple-lays-out-case-in-beach-dispute/ 
[https://perma.cc/S292-W2RZ]; Chris Lindahl, Dune-Walking Ban Floated in Sandwich Beach-
Access Dispute, CAPE COD TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://www.capecodtimes.com/news/20170124/dune-walking-ban-floated-in-sandwich-beach-
access-dispute [https://perma.cc/4YBF-8KVD]; Ann O’Neill, Drawing a Line in the Sand in 
Malibu, CNN (Sept. 5, 2015), https://edition.cnn. 
com/2015/09/05/us/malibu-day-at-the-beach/index.html [https://perma.cc/8GYC-7HGF]; Tara 
Smith, A Line in the Sand: Neighbors Disagree on Beach Access Rights, LONG ISLAND ADVANCE 
(July 6, 2017), https://www.longislandadvance.net/4601/A-line-in-the-sand-Neighbors-disagree-on-
beach-access-rights [https://perma.cc/27MT-9EX9]; Va. Supreme Court: Grandview Land Owner 
Can Keep People Off Beach Property, DAILY PRESS (June 8, 2015, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.dailypress.com/news/hampton/dp-va-supreme-court-grandview-property-owner-can-
block-off-beach-20150608-story.html [https://perma.cc/5CA9-83PL]. 
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landowners have tried to use trespass laws to prevent members of the 
public from walking, playing, or resting on the upper, “dry-sand” beach.2 
Owners have also tried to use the Constitution to keep the public out. 
These constitutional lawsuits variously allege that state actions meant to 
facilitate or endorse public use of dry sand are: uncompensated takings 
of private property (Fifth Amendment),3 deprivations of private property 
without due process of law (Fifth Amendment),4 unreasonable seizures 
of private property (Fourth Amendment),5 or unconstitutional 
restrictions on speech conducted on private property (First 
Amendment).6 
Obviously, the linchpin of both the trespass and constitutional claims 
is the allegation that part of the beach is in fact private property.7 More 
specifically, because both types of cases are challenges to public access, 
a landowner’s success depends upon a showing that the landowner holds 
the right to exclude others from entering onto her property.8 Put 
differently, if the beachfront landowner cannot establish that she holds a 
right to exclude, she is not entitled to relief when members of the public 
                                                     
2. See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 729 (R.I. 1982). The term “dry sand” has several possible 
meanings. It can be used to refer generally to the upper part of the beach, that is, the part that is not 
presently wet or submerged. Courts and scholars often use the term as a synonym for “private.” See, 
e.g., Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. 
__, 138 S. Ct. 75 (2017) (“The Town was incorporated in 1957. The public has enjoyed access to its 
beaches, including both the publicly-owned foreshore—or wet sand beach—and the private 
property dry sand beaches, since at least that date.”); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 
449, 452 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994). In this usage, “dry sand” means the part of 
the beach that lies inland of the landward boundary of the state-owned, public trust tidal and 
submerged lands. Under any of the various state approaches to locating the legal boundary between 
private and public beach, described infra at note 31, both the “dry sand” and “wet sand” will 
sometimes be actually dry or wet.  
3. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825–28 (1987); Grupe v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 171–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 197; Severance v. 
Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 732 (Tex. 2012); Brannan v. State, 365 S.W.3d 1, 24–27 (Tex. App. 
2010), rev’d, 390 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2013). 
4. See Crystal Dunes Owners Ass’n v. City of Destin, 476 F. App’x 180, 183–84 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished opinion). 
5. See Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2009). 
6. See Goodwin v. Walton County, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1262–65 (N.D. Fla. 2017). 
7. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005) (“[A]s a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the 
claimant has established a property interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment . . . . If the 
claimant fails to demonstrate the existence of a legally cognizable property interest, the courts [sic] 
task is at an end.” (citations omitted)). 
8. The right to exclude is, along with the right to use and enjoy and the right to alienate, one of 
the three cardinal rights associated with property ownership in the common law tradition. See 
generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998). 
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use the beach in question (or when government, on behalf of the public, 
authorizes or facilitates public use).9 
Although states and advocates for public dry-sand access have won 
some public-use cases, the theories in those cases do not question the 
assumption that landowners hold title to the dry sand at issue. Rather, the 
argument is that the public has access because the privately-owned dry-
sand beach is burdened with some form of public right-of-way. This is 
true whether the theory is one of prescriptive easement,10 custom,11 
implied dedication,12 or the public trust doctrine.13 
This Article questions whether the beachfront property owner has 
exclusive private rights—in any part of the beach—to begin with.14 The 
vigilant landowner’s problem is that the combination of common law 
rules governing the location of beach boundaries and the ever-changing 
topography of sandy beaches produces what might be called real-time 
locational uncertainty. Real-time locational uncertainty means that it is 
impossible to determine the exact location of a beach boundary at time 
zero, that is, at the moment the landowner wishes to enforce her rights.15 
                                                     
9. This Article focuses on the issue of public use of the dry sand. I am not arguing that the 
absence of a right to exclude from the beach means that the owner cannot exclude the public from, 
for example, the adjacent beach house. It might seem logical to make such a leap, because the 
elimination of a right to exclude on the beach does not necessarily result in the automatic creation of 
a new boundary on the seaward side of a structure. However, a policy of public dry-sand access, 
which could be supported by the elimination of the beach boundary, is quite different from a policy 
of public beach house access. 
10. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77–78 (Fla. 1974); 
Concerned Citizens of Brunswick Cty. Taxpayers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 404 S.E.2d 677, 
690–91 (N.C. 1991); Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 727–28 (Tex. 2012). 
11. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969). 
12. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1009, (West 2018), as recognized in Scher v. Burke, 395 P.3d 680, 682 (Cal. 2017). 
13. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 368–70 (N.J. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573–74 (N.J. 1978); 
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
14. In the conclusion to one of his many insightful articles on real and conceptual boundaries 
between public and private property, Professor Joseph Sax wrote that “[t]he reality is that there 
exists on the seashore a zone that is neither wholly public nor wholly private . . . .” Joseph L. Sax, 
The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 
356 (2009) (emphasis added). Professor Sax did not explain why he used the word “reality,” which 
suggests—like this Article—the legal inevitability of shared ownership rather than a mere policy 
preference. 
15. Others have noted the difficulty in real-time location of the ocean-side boundary; the novel 
argument here is that it is not merely difficult, but impossible. See infra Part I. The only ocean-
fronting state where this would not be true is Hawai’i, which bases ocean-side boundaries on “the 
upper reaches of the wash of the waves . . . usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation growth, or 
the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-1 (2018). The 
edge of vegetation growth is sometimes called the “line of vegetation,” while the “upper limit of 
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The location of the boundary at time zero cannot be known until after a 
court has adjudicated the boundary months or years later. 
The time lag between an alleged trespass and a judicial determination 
of the boundary precludes the use of trespass law to exclude others from 
the dry sand. Successful trespass actions require proof that the alleged 
trespasser was “aware of the fact that he [was] making an unwarranted 
intrusion.”16 In other words, she must have known the location of the 
property boundary at the moment she crossed it.17 Even after the 
boundary determination proceeding has concluded, it will still not be 
possible for a landowner to prove the current boundary location. From 
the date the suit was filed, the beach will have begun to change again. 
The location in the court’s final order is legally accurate for only one 
moment in time, a moment that is, by the end of the litigation, well in the 
past. 
If there is no right to exclude, then constitutional challenges positing 
state interference with that right cannot move forward. It is not possible 
for the state to have interfered with a property right that never existed in 
the first place.18 In addition to abrogating constitutional challenges, the 
theory put forward in this Article opens countless acres of privately 
claimed beach to public recreational use. This is an important result, 
because while some beaches have long been de facto open by virtue of 
an implicit agreement between private landowners and the broader 
community,19 beach access in many parts of the country remains hotly 
contested. 
                                                     
debris” is known as the “wash line.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001(5) (West 2017); 1-30 
WALTER G. ROBILLARD & LANE J. BOUMAN, CLARK ON SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES § 30.05 
(8th ed. 2018). See infra Part I for complete definitions and explanations of tidal datums. 
16. Warfield v. State, 554 A.2d 1238, 1250 (Md. 1989) (cited in 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.2(c) (2d ed. 2003)). While criminal trespass law varies state by 
state, the typical statute sets out two sets of elements: one for trespass into buildings and occupied 
structures, and a second for trespass elsewhere on the property, e.g., fields, yards, etc. It is this 
second kind of trespass that is relevant here. To be guilty of trespass on the beach, the defendant 
must have entered into and remained on the property “knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do 
so.” LAFAVE, supra, § 21.2(b). “Knowing” entry is defined as entry with notice and intent: the 
landowner must have given the alleged trespasser notice of the boundary through the use of fences, 
signs, or verbal communication. Id. 
17. While civil trespass does not include a mens rea requirement, a civil lawsuit is not ideal for 
on-the-spot enforcement. For one thing, the landowner would have to obtain the name and address 
of the alleged trespasser to serve summons and complaint. In any event, civil trespass, like criminal 
trespass, does require proof that the trespasser was actually on the property. For reasons explained 
below, this proof does not exist at the time of the alleged trespass. See infra Part II. 
18. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005). 
19. See Robert Thompson, Beach Access, Trespass, and the Social Enactment of Property, 17 
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Some might see the idea of a missing right to exclude as in conflict 
with property theory, much of which stresses the importance of 
exclusive rights.20 The inquiry in this Article, however, is not a 
theoretical or normative one. Rather, the analysis is based on rote 
application of eight centuries of common law to the reality that sandy 
beaches are always in the process of changing.21 
Could courts or legislatures change the common law rules to create 
the possibility of a right to exclude—to privatize beaches—going 
forward? While it might be possible to rewrite the common law rules to 
create an enforceable boundary, those changes would bump up against 
the range of good-policy arguments long reflected by existing rules.22 
For example, eliminating the legal difference between artificial and 
natural accretion would enable oceanfront owners to dump sand on 
adjacent state property, then claim it as their own.23 
Part II of this Article explains how the common law doctrines of 
avulsion and artificial accretion make real-time location of beach 
boundaries impossible. Part III explores the effect of real-time locational 
uncertainty on property rights, namely, its dramatic impact on the 
oceanfront owner’s right to exclude, and on lawsuits premised on the 
existence of that right. Part IV explores the future of sandy beach 
property rights in the absence of the right to exclude. While courts and 
legislators might be inclined to modify existing beach-boundary doctrine 
to create an enforceable right to exclude, it would be better to develop a 
more realistic set of rules for beach use that fairly protect both the public 
and beachfront property owners. The best approach is the one that 
landowners and the beachgoing public have already implicitly adopted 
                                                     
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 351, 361–71 (2012). For other examples of implicit social agreements 
regarding property, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property 
Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 60–65 (2015); Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom: Allocating 
Space in Public Places, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 199, 199–204 (2006); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343–45 (1997). 
20. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 531 (2005); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 
(2008); James Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167 (2017). 
21. In his excellent treatment of the legal history of waterfront property doctrines, Professor Sax 
discusses several English cases from the fourteenth century. Sax, supra note 14, at 314–20. 
22. See generally Sax, supra note 14. 
23. It is worth noting that there would be some other legal obstacles to dumping sand on the 
beach, even where the underlying property was deemed private. Section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act, for example, would require oceanfront landowners to obtain a permit before renourishing their 
beach. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018). Section 404 mandates a permit for the deposit of dredged or fill 
material into waters of the United States, which would include ocean waters. Id. 
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on the many de facto public beaches: under the terms of this “crowd-
sourced” arrangement, the state and the landowner permit public use of 
dry sand except to the extent that such use interferes unreasonably with 
the beachfront owner’s ability to enjoy her property. 
I. REAL-TIME LOCATIONAL UNCERTAINTY, EXPLAINED 
Purchasers of oceanfront property are likely aware that the land they 
are buying is subject to change. At the very least, many owners will have 
purchased their property in jurisdictions that require sellers of oceanfront 
land to make special disclosures to buyers. South Carolina, Florida, and 
Texas are among the states in which legislation mandates disclosures 
about the special economic, legal, and physical risks inherent in owning 
oceanfront land.24 Texas law, for example, requires this disclosure: 
DISCLOSURE NOTICE CONCERNING LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC RISKS OF PURCHASING COASTAL REAL 
PROPERTY NEAR A BEACH 
WARNING: THE FOLLOWING NOTICE OF POTENTIAL 
RISKS OF ECONOMIC LOSS TO YOU AS THE 
PURCHASER OF COASTAL REAL PROPERTY IS 
REQUIRED BY STATE LAW. 
x Read this notice carefully. Do not sign this contract until 
you fully understand the risks you are assuming. 
x By purchasing this property, you may be assuming 
economic risks over and above the risks involved in 
purchasing inland real property. 
x If you own a structure located on coastal real property 
near a gulf coast beach, it may come to be located on the 
public beach because of coastal erosion and storm events. 
x As the owner of a structure located on the public beach, 
you could be sued by the State of Texas and ordered to 
remove the structure. 
x The costs of removing a structure from the public beach 
and any other economic loss incurred because of a 
removal order would be solely your responsibility.25 
                                                     
24. FLA. STAT. § 161.57 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-330 (2018); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. § 61.025 (West 2017).  
25. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.025(a). In at least one state, courts have held that similar 
disclosures might be mandatory. In Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711, 718–19 (R.I. 2003), the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that a real estate agent with knowledge of an erosion problem 
on a piece of marsh front property would be obligated to disclose that issue to the buyer. 
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At the same time, many beachfront landowners also believe the 
ocean-side boundary to be solid—knowable and enforceable. This belief 
is understandable, given that statutes and the common law often use 
technical terms such as “mean high-tide line” as synonyms for “property 
boundary.” For example, a Florida statute provides that the “[m]ean 
high-water line along the shores of land immediately bordering on 
navigable waters is recognized and declared to be the boundary between 
the foreshore owned by the state in its sovereign capacity and upland 
subject to private ownership.”26 California law states that “the owner of 
the upland, when it borders on tide water, takes to ordinary high-water 
mark.”27 And North Carolina’s statute provides that “[t]he seaward 
boundary of all property within the State of North Carolina, not owned 
by the State, which adjoins the ocean, is the mean high water mark.”28 
Technical-sounding terms such as “mean high-tide line” incorrectly 
imply data-driven certainty and a high degree of specificity in the 
process of locating beach boundaries.29 Such terminology elicits a false 
confidence in the idea that locating the line is as simple as bringing a 
surveyor out to take some physical measurements. In fact, the process of 
setting the coastline is complex, time-consuming, and characterized by 
uncertainty. It involves questions of law as well as science. The only 
thing certain is that no one can know exactly where the line is at the 
precise moment of a would-be trespass. 
To illustrate why that is the case, consider the process of boundary 
location on a typical sandy beach at North Padre Island, Texas.30 Under 
                                                     
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 177.28(1) (West 2018). 
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 2018).  
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 77-20(a) (West 2018).  
29. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has made the mistake of overestimating the precision of 
science-based line drawing. In an early case dealing with oceanfront boundaries, the Court noted 
that the use of mean high tide allowed for “requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable 
tidelands . . . .” Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 27 (1935) (emphasis added). 
In the language of the linguist, technical-sounding terms like “mean high tide” likely have a 
connotative meaning of specificity. See Denise Baden & Ian A. Harwood, Terminology Matters: A 
Critical Exploration of Corporate Social Responsibility Terms, 116 J. BUS. ETHICS 615, 624 (2013) 
(“Terms, such as ‘sustainability’ that are poorly understood by the public, rely on scientific 
knowledge or have historically been associated with a range of different meanings should be 
avoided, as such ambiguities can at best lead to unproductive debate, or at worst be cynically 
exploited.”). 
30. Although part of North Padre is privately owned, the federal government owns the bulk of the 
island, which Congress has designated as a national seashore and as part of the national park 
system. I chose to use North Padre as an example because it is one of the few shorelines for which 
scientists have collected sufficient data. Specifically, the hypothetical in this section is based on 
findings from two studies: JAMES C. GIBEAUT ET AL., TEX. COASTAL COORDINATION COUNCIL, 
CHANGES IN GULF SHORELINE POSITION, MUSTANG, AND NORTH PADRE ISLANDS, TEXAS (May 
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Texas law, the tentative private-public boundary is “the mean higher-
high-water line.”31 A land surveyor will first obtain, from a government 
database, the local elevation of the mean higher-high-water plane.32 
(Tides are measured vertically, in meters or feet of elevation.33) The 
height of the mean higher-high-water plane is equal to the average 
height of each day’s highest high tide, measured over the most recent 
nineteen-year “tidal datum epoch.”34 After creating an imaginary plane 
at that height, the surveyor uses tools that allow her to project the plane 
into the face of the beach, thereby generating a mean higher-high-water 
line.35 
                                                     
2001) and Robert A. Morton & F. Michael Speed, Evaluation of Shorelines and Legal Boundaries 
Controlled by Water Levels on Sandy Beaches, 14 J. COASTAL RES. 1373 (1998). 
31. It is “tentative” because it is subject to adjustments for past episodes of avulsion or 
artificial accretion. See infra sections I.A and I.B. 
“Mean higher high water” is what is known as a tidal datum. All ocean-fronting states but 
Hawai’i use tidal datums, such as mean higher high water, to determine the ocean-side boundary. 
STEACY DOPP HICKS, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING TIDES 52 
(2006); see Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205A-1 (defining the shoreline as “[T]he upper reaches of the 
waves . . . usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation growth, or the upper limit of debris left by 
the wash of the waves”). “A datum is a reference from which linear measurements are made. It can 
be a physical point, line, or plane. It can also be an invisible point, line, or plane positioned by a 
statistical treatment of the numerical values of a particular natural phenomenon.” HICKS, supra, at 
51. Texas actually uses two different datums for locating the ocean-side boundary, depending on 
whether private ownership of the upland in question began under Spanish or Mexican rule, or after 
Texas became a state. In the former scenario, the appropriate datum is mean higher-high-water; in 
the latter, it is mean high tide. See John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 
S.W.3d 268, 278–80 (Tex. 2002); Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 169–70 (Tex. 1958). 
32. A federal agency, the National Geodetic Survey, is responsible for developing the tidal 
datums that surveyors use in locating datum-based lines such as the mean higher-high-water line or 
the mean high-tide line. See NAT’L GEODETIC SURVEY, 
https://www.ngs.noaa.gov/INFO/WhatWeDo.shtml [https://perma.cc/3VDL-LDJC]. For a 
surveyor’s description of the process of locating datum-based lines, see WALTER G. ROBILLARD & 
DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 252–80 (7th ed. 
2014); George M. Cole, Tidal Water Boundaries, 20 STETSON L. REV. 165, 170–76 (1990).  
33. HICKS, supra note 31, at 45. 
34. Id. The National Geodetic Survey uses an average of measurements taken over a Metonic 
Cycle, about nineteen years, to generate the most accurate results. 
[The Metonic Cycle], first determined by Meton of Athens in 432 BC, captures a long-period 
change in the amplitude of the tide due to the orbital paths of the Earth and Moon relative to 
the Sun. The Metonic Cycle was selected [as the length of time needed to measure average 
tides] because it includes daily, monthly, annual, and decadal changes in the amplitude of 
tides . . . . 
Mike Szabados, Understanding Sea-Level Change, 236 ACSM BULL. 10, 12 (2008), 
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/Understanding_Sea_Level_Change.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4D8M-X9KS]. 
35. This intersection of the plane and the beach profile forms the equivalent of a contour line on a 
topographical map. Or, imagine you are standing on a raft on a dead-calm sea, aiming a laser 
pointer at the beach while holding it level to the water at the height of the glass sheet. The spot 
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Figure 1 illustrates the land surveyor’s method for locating a datum-
based line, such as the mean higher-high-water line: 
 
Figure 1: 
Projecting the Plane into the Beach 
 
 
The X’s in Figure 1 mark the points where the mean higher-high-
water plane intersects with the beach profiles from Time 1 and Time 2. 
Figure 2 shows the more familiar aerial view of the same beach. The two 
lines shown are the result of the process illustrated in Figure 1.
                                                     
where the laser beam hits the sand is one point in the mean higher-high-water line. If you now 
paddle a few feet down the shore, then point the laser again, then connect this point with the first, 
you have begun the process of generating the line. 
Side View – Beach Profile 
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Figure 2: 
Lines Produced by Projecting the MHHW Plane into the Beach 
The first problem in enforcing the ocean-side boundary arises from 
the fact that the mean higher-high-water line is, in part, a product of the 
dynamic topography of the beach. The mean higher-high-water plane 
remains fixed for the entirety of each nineteen-year tidal epoch; the 
beach profile, however, is unstable. Waves, tides, wind, and other forces 
constantly rearrange sand on beaches.36 As sand moves, the shape of the 
beach changes, and the result is a new mean higher-high-water line. For 
example, in Figures 1 and 2, the line has moved seaward owing to the 
now-higher beach profile.37 The seaward movement of the line could 
have been the result of slow processes, such as regular sand deposition 
by near-shore currents, or it could have been the result of more rapid 
processes, such as the intense wave action brought on by a recent storm. 
Due to the costs of collecting data, there are very few studies of short-
term—hour-to-hour or day-to-day—variability in the location of the 
legal coastline. One limited study of beaches in North Carolina and 
Virginia showed that the mean high-tide line moved horizontally every 
twelve hours and twenty-five minutes by between 0.12 and 5.8 meters.38 
                                                     
36. See generally A.C. BROWN & A. MCLACHLAN, ECOLOGY OF SANDY SHORES (2d ed. 1990); 
ROBIN DAVIDSON-ARNOTT, INTRODUCTION TO COASTAL PROCESSES AND GEOMORPHOLOGY (2010). 
37. Donna Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries, and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 24–25 (2009). 
38. Mary Jean Pajak & Stephen Leatherman, The High Water Line as Shoreline Indicator, 18 J. 
COASTAL RES. 329, 330–31 (2002) (citing Robert Dolan et al., The Reliability of Shoreline Change 
Measurements from Aerial Photographs, 48 SHORE & BEACH 22, 22–29 (1980)).  
Aerial View 
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On North Padre Island, studies have documented monthly changes in the 
location of the mean higher-high-water line of between 2.5 and 14.5 
meters.39 For the landowner who needs to mark and announce the 
boundary to prosecute trespassers, this variability presents a significant 
obstacle.40 She might hire a surveyor to locate the line; however, the 
probability that the line will be in the exact same place, even a few hours 
later, is small. In other words, anything short of a real-time survey 
cannot establish the exact location of the mean higher-high-water line. 
To understand how nature can so quickly cause such frequent and 
dramatic changes in line location, it is most important to remember that 
beaches typically feature very gradual slopes. In North Carolina, for 
example, beaches have slopes of between approximately three and six 
degrees.41 On a three-degree sloped beach, one would walk about fifty-
seven feet inland from the sea before gaining just three feet of elevation; 
on a six-degree slope, it would take only twenty-nine feet to gain the 
same amount of elevation. Suppose that the mean higher-high-water 
plane happens to be three feet in elevation as well. If currents or tides 
moved the sand so that the slope of the profile changed from three to six 
degrees, the mean higher-high-water line would move twenty-eight feet 
(fifty-seven minus twenty-nine)! Even a smaller, one-degree change in 
slope—from three to four degrees—would cause the line to move 
thirteen feet. Small changes in the slope of the beach can occur very 
quickly, for example, as the result of a single high tide.42 
Even if the landowner were to go to the trouble of retaining a 
surveyor on the premises for real-time line drawing, there is another 
issue that would stand in the way of an effective criminal trespass 
prosecution: Surveys used to determine tidal datums like mean higher 
high water are inherently inaccurate. Inaccuracy in line-drawing results 
from irreducible error in, among other things, the measurement of the 
height of tides.43 Studies have estimated that this error in vertical 
measurement translates to uncertainty in the range of three to nine 
meters horizontally.44 In other words, the true higher-high-water line 
                                                     
39. Morton & Speed, supra note 30, at 1378. 
40. For open spaces, like beaches, a landowner must give the public notice of the boundary 
location, e.g., by posting a “no trespassing” sign, before the state can enforce a criminal trespass. 
See infra text accompanying notes 175–177. 
41. KARA S. DORAN, JOSEPH W. LONG & JACQUELYN R. OVERBECK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, A METHOD FOR DETERMINING AVERAGE BEACH SLOPE AND AVERAGE BEACH SLOPE 
VARIABILITY ON U.S. SANDY COASTLINES (2015) (source estimates in radians). 
42. Id. at 2. 
43. Pajak & Leatherman, supra note 38, at 331. 
44. Id. 
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may be thirty feet higher or lower on the beach—further away from or 
closer to the ocean—than the real-time surveyed line.45 
Because these two obstacles are the result of measurement problems, 
technological advancements might eventually solve them.46 One can 
fairly easily imagine, for example, a world in which people—
landowners, beach-walkers, and the police—could use their mobile 
devices to see the instantaneous mean higher-high-water line 
superimposed on a Google map image.47 
There is, however, a third obstacle to a trespass case, one that 
technology cannot solve and that legal scholarship and judicial opinions 
have largely ignored. This is the problem of divergent lines: sometimes 
the mean higher-high-water line will not be the same as the property 
boundary between the oceanfront owner and the state. Under the 
common law, certain kinds of beach change—namely change that is 
rapid or artificially caused—result in a property boundary that is in a 
different place from the datum-based line: because of these rules, finding 
the mean higher-high-water line would be just the beginning of a process 
into finding the property boundary. If our hypothetical North Padre 
Island landowner wants to establish her property boundaries with 
                                                     
45. This problem might be solved through new technology. Id. at 336. Technology will not, 
however, resolve scientific controversies over the most reliable or normatively desirable ways to 
calculate datums like mean higher high water. See Xin Liu et al., A State of the Art Review on High 
Water Mark (HWM) Determination, 102 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 178, 188 (2014); Morton & 
Speed, supra note 30, at 1383. 
46. They are both purely measurement problems, except to the extent there is controversy about 
what ought to be measured. The question of what to measure is more than purely scientific, and has 
a legal component. Note that in Texas, for example, the datum to be used in setting the boundary on 
Spanish or Mexican grant property is mean higher high water, not mean higher high tide. The word 
“water” means that the surveyor is to include all influences on the height of the highest daily high 
water, including meteorological events such as storms. Texas law was not entirely certain on this 
point until the Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. 
v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. 2002). 
47. Google maps currently includes some topographic information, although the data are from 
other maps. Developer Guide, GOOGLE MAPS PLATFORM, 
https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/ elevation/intro [https://perma.cc/66MT-X753]. 
In other words, the application does not incorporate the type of real-time topographical information 
necessary for finding an elevation on an active beach. To do this, Google would need technology 
that constantly measured changes in elevation. At present, the only remote sensing tool that can 
accomplish this is LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), which must be carried by a boat or a 
plane, vehicles that—unlike groups of satellites—cannot continuously measure the entire earth. For 
an introduction to how LIDAR is used to measure beach elevations, see Hilary F. Stockdon et al., 
Estimation of Shoreline Position and Change Using Airborne Topographic Lidar Data, 18 J. 
COASTAL RES. 502 (2002). 
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certainty sufficient to support successful trespass cases, then she will 
have to hire a lawyer and go to court.48 
A. Avulsion and Divergence 
Under the common law, when nature gradually builds up a beach 
such that the datum-based line moves seaward,49 the change is known as 
“accretion.”50 When the opposite occurs, and the line moves gradually 
landward, the change is known as “erosion.”51 The doctrine of gradual 
change has existed in the common law since the fourteenth century,52 
and it is very simple: when the beach and the line change due to 
accretion or erosion, the property boundary also changes.53 
“Avulsion,” on the other hand, is a legal term for rapid change to a 
beach.54 While accretion refers to gradual movement of the datum-based 
                                                     
48. It is possible that the vigilant landowner could convince the local police to encourage beach-
goers to stay lower on the beach. If the property line is unenforceable, however, beach-goers are not 
committing a crime when they walk on or reasonably use the dry sand. Thus, police likely will not 
be interested in herding or arresting them without an accompanying breach of the peace. This would 
seem to be especially likely in areas with tourism-driven economies, where police would be even 
less motivated to interfere with legal use of the beach by outsiders. 
49. In the geologist’s language, “accretion” refers specifically to the addition of sediment to the 
shore, via currents, wind, or otherwise. The law, though, is concerned with the movement of the 
datum-based line. If the datum-based line moves seaward slowly, the law considers that to be 
“accretion.” The law does not care whether “new” sand has accumulated or if sand that was already 
there simply moved around. 
50. The common law of accretion and erosion has its origins in English cases dating to the 
fourteenth century. Sax, supra note 14, at 309. 
51. As with the term “accretion,” the term “erosion” has a broader meaning in the law than it does 
in geology: “Erosion” is any slowly occurring change that causes the datum-based line to move 
landward. So, for example, if the upland is slowly subsiding, the loss in elevation will cause the line 
to move landward. In subsidence, sometimes caused by groundwater withdrawals, the beach has not 
lost sand; rather, the beach has sunk. 
52. Sax, supra note 14, at 309. 
53. Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957, 
1958–59 (2013). 
54. Blackstone used the words “small and imperceptible” as adjectives to describe the kind of 
change that causes erosion and accretion, as opposed to avulsion. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 
195 (William C. Sprague ed., abr., 9th ed. 1915) (1765). According to Professor Sax, scholars of the 
past have argued that the size of the change—small or large—should be, in addition to the rate of 
the change, a factor in distinguishing accretion or erosion from avulsion. Sax, supra note 14, at 
330–34. Beginning at the latest with The King v. Lord Yarborough, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 668, 672–
74 (K.B.); 3 B. & C. 91, courts are concerned only with “the meaning of ‘imperceptibly,’” that is, 
the rate of the change. Id. One can read this as consistent with Blackstone’s use of “small”: each 
addition or subtraction of land is so small as to make it imperceptible. 
A survey of the law in the twenty-one, common law, ocean-fronting states that use tidal datums 
for boundary-setting shows that only Texas does not distinguish between slow and rapid change for 
purposes of title. See Josh Eagle, Survey of Ocean-fronting States’ Rules on Avulsion and Artificial 
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line seaward and erosion refers to gradual movement of the line 
landward, avulsion refers to rapid change in either direction.55 I use 
“positive avulsion” for rapid beach change causing the datum-based line 
to move seaward; and, “negative avulsion” for rapid change that leads to 
movement of the line landward. The doctrine of avulsion, unlike the 
doctrine of gradual change, holds that rapid change does not move the 
property line.56 In other words, after an avulsive event, the property line 
remains where it was before the event.57 
For example, suppose a storm—a common cause of rapid change—
lowers the elevation of the beach so that, if a surveyor came out after the 
storm to find the mean high-tide line, she would “draw” it thirty yards 
further inland (Line 2) than where it had been prior to the storm (Line 
1).58 However, the property line would remain where it had been prior to 
the storm (Line 1). There would be a thirty-yard difference between the 
datum-based line (Line 2) and the property boundary (Line 1); the 
property boundary (Line 1) would be under water, giving the beachfront 
owner title to newly submerged lands; the beach, if it still existed, would 
be entirely private.
                                                     
Accretion 1–17 (Sep. 3, 2018) (unpublished survey) (on file with the Washington Law Review). The 
majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 723 
(Tex. 2012), asserts that Texas has not yet had occasion to distinguish for purposes of title, but that 
state law does distinguish between accretion and avulsion for other purposes. This language 
conflicts with language in earlier Texas Supreme Court opinions, such as the one in Luttes v. State, 
324 S.W.2d 167, 175–76 (Tex. 1958), where the court seems to consider the imperceptible nature of 
the change to a beach a fact critical to title. There are two other ocean-fronting states: Louisiana, 
which is obviously not a common-law jurisdiction, and Hawai’i, which uses the vegetation line for 
boundary-setting, making accretion and avulsion relatively rare. 
55. JOSH EAGLE, COASTAL LAW 304–25 (2d ed. 2015).  
56. Sax, supra note 14, at 306. 
57. See id.; Williams & Wyman, supra note 53, at 1959. 
58. See infra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: 
Divergence Resulting from Rapid Landward Movement  
of MHTL (Negative Avulsion) 
 
The post-storm MHTL is not the post-storm property line. 
 
Under the common law doctrine of avulsion, a beachfront owner 
whose property was affected by negative avulsion would possess a 
temporary right to reclaim the submerged part of his property, that is, a 
right to fill the newly submerged lands with sand out to Line 1.59 If the 
landowner does not reclaim within a reasonable period of time, the right 
to reclaim expires, and the property line becomes once again the datum 
line (Line 2).60 In other words, law treats the unreclaimed change as 
erosion. 
Suppose the same storm raised the elevation of the beach so that the 
mean high-tide line (Line 2) moved thirty yards seaward.61 Under the 
avulsion doctrine, the property line (Line 1) would remain where it had 
been before the storm. Thus, the beachfront owner would own exactly 
                                                     
59. See, e.g., Beach Colony II v. Cal. Coastal Com., 199 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201 (1984) (citing CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1015 (1872) (“If a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, carries away, by sudden 
violence, a considerable and distinguishable part of a bank, and bears it to the opposite bank, or to 
another part of the same bank, the owner of the part carried away may reclaim it within a year after 
the owner of the land to which it has been united takes possession thereof.”); Walton County v. Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008); In re Town of Hempstead, 144 
N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
60. See supra note 50. 
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what she owned beforehand, and the state would own the newly created 
dry sand between Lines 1 and 2. This result has a dramatic effect on the 
property rights of the beachfront owner and the state. Because the owner 
no longer owns property touching the sea, she no longer holds riparian 
or littoral rights. Most notably, she is not entitled to ownership of future 
accretion. The state, as owner of the new oceanfront parcel—the ribbon 
of positive avulsion that separates the former beachfront owner from the 
sea—will own all future accretion as the new beachfront owner. 
 
Figure 4: 
Divergence Resulting from Rapid Seaward Movement of the  
MHTL (Positive Avulsion) 
As in Figure 3, the post-storm MHTL is not the post-storm property line. 
 
It is unclear whether the right to reclaim extends to states as well as 
private landowners.62 Unlike waterways that are used for commercial 
navigation, states are unlikely to try to exercise a right to reclaim along a 
beach after positive avulsion, by dredging the avulsive ribbon of new 
upland to restore submerged status.63 If states did have the right to 
                                                     
62. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the Florida Supreme Court held that the state could 
exercise its right to reclaim after negative avulsion. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. at 1116. 
A logical question is: What did the state lose in the avulsive event that it wished to restore? After 
all, negative avulsion results in a loss of private upland. Although the court’s opinion is confusing 
on this point, it appears that the court is authorizing the state to rebuild the public, pre-avulsion 
beach—the part of the beach below the mean high-tide line. EAGLE, supra note 55, at 335. 
63. Government dredging of newly formed accumulations of sand is common practice in 












06 - Eagle.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018 5:45 PM 
1198 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1181 
 
reclaim, there would be further uncertainty. The important question 
would be: Does the state’s right to reclaim expire, like the private 
landowners’? On the one hand, symmetry in the rules seems fitting; on 
the other hand, expiration would conflict with the core function of the 
public trust doctrine—to prevent states from alienating trust property 
without prior full and transparent process.64 If the state’s right to reclaim 
did expire, it would mean that publicly-owned positive avulsion would, 
as a matter of course, shift from public to private ownership unless the 
state had timely dredged the newly created beach. In other words, the 
property boundary might ultimately shift from Line 1 to Line 2 in 
Figure 4. 
When a surveyor arrives at a beach, she is equipped to locate the 
mean high-tide line. She is not in a position to know or judge whether 
the present property line matches that mean high-tide line. If the 
topography of the beach is purely a product of gradual change, that is, 
accretion or erosion, then it could be true that the datum and property 
lines match up.65 If, on the other hand, avulsion played a role in altering 
the topography, then the lines might not coincide. If negative avulsion 
                                                     
governments the right to restore navigability without fear of liability. In oceanfront waters, other 
than perhaps those near ports, there is usually not a commercial navigation concern. 
64. State-owned tidal and submerged lands are classified as public trust property, a type of 
property governed by stringent rules meant to protect the public interest in those lands. See Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455–56 (1892) (“The ownership of the navigable waters of the 
harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the state. 
The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated, except in 
those instances mentioned, of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when 
parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.”); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 650–52 (1986) 
(noting the “most meaningful” construction of the public trust doctrine requires that transfers of 
trust property, or activities affecting trust property, “occur only after consideration of any adverse 
impact on the trust resource and then only if such impact is either minimal or necessary”). As the 
Supreme Court of Alaska wrote, “[b]efore any tideland grant may be found to be free of the public 
trust . . . the legislature’s intent to so convey it must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied in 
the legislation authorizing the transfer.” CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1119 
(Alaska 1988); see also Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Env’t, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 
674, 684 (N.C. 1995) (Legislature can transfer trust lands, but only if it uses a “special grant” that 
lays out its intent to do so in the “clearest and most express terms.”). 
On the public trust doctrine and its component rules, see MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY 
CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW 3–56 (2013); Josh Eagle, Taking the Oceanfront Lot, 91 IND. L.J. 851, 870–79 (2016); Joseph 
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–91 (1970); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 50–54 (2006). 
65. This would be true unless artificial forces were the cause of the accretion or erosion. See infra 
section II.B. 
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has previously occurred, the property line would be off the beach and 
under the water; or, if the landowner’s right to reclaim has expired, the 
property line would be identical to the mean high-tide line. If positive 
avulsion has previously occurred, the property line would be in the 
middle of the dry-sand beach; or, if the right to reclaim applies to the 
state and the right has expired, then the mean high-tide line could once 
again be the property line. The important point is that, while the 
surveyor can potentially locate the datum-based line, she cannot know 
where the property line is. 
The question of whether a particular change to the beach constitutes 
gradual change (erosion or accretion) or rapid change (avulsion) is a 
mixed question of fact and law.66 There is no agreed-upon legal 
definition of what rates of change qualify as gradual or rapid.67 A finder 
of fact would first examine aerial photos, satellite images, or other 
historical data on change to the beach over time in an effort to judge rate 
of change. She would in addition receive testimony from coastal 
oceanographers on the likely causes of change to the beach over time, 
such as storms, currents, or other events. Based on these factual inputs, 
the finder of fact would conclude that the change in question should be 
characterized, for legal purposes, as either gradual or rapid.68 
                                                     
66.  
Since the problem in [accretion] cases . . . is usually more historical than legal, and since such 
cases are usually tried to the Court, which is ordinarily competent to give proper weight to the 
various items of evidence, the testimony may properly take a wide range, the Court admitting 
anything which has any rational tendency to throw light on the problem in hand. 
 Ussery v. Anderson-Tully Co., 122 F. Supp. 115, 122–23 (E.D. Ark. 1954). 
67. Henry De Bracton’s thirteenth-century treatise ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 
contains this description of accretion: 
[It] is an imperceptible increment which is added so gradually that you cannot perceive [how 
much] the increase is from one moment of time to another. Indeed, though you fix your gaze 
on it for a whole day, the feebleness of human sight cannot distinguish such subtle increases, as 
may be seen in [the growth of] a gourd and other such things. 
HENRY DE BRACTON, 2 BRACTON ON THE LAW AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 44 (Samuel F. Thorne 
trans., 1968) (cited in Sax, supra note 14, at 313–14). This somewhat vague and arbitrary test is 
identical to the one courts use today. See, e.g., Accardi v. Regions Bank, 201 So.3d 743 (Fla. App. 
2016); State v. Murphy, 202 So.3d 1243 (Miss. 2016); S & R Am. Farms, LLC v. Russell Farm & 
Ranch Corp., No. A-15-998, 2016 WL 7094135 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016). 
68. For a good example of the kinds of facts entailed in a judicial proceeding quieting title to 
oceanfront land, see Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1958). In Luttes, among other things, the 
landowner’s expert examined core samples that purported to show whether layers of sand had been 
added gradually or rapidly. Id. at 172–73. 
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B. Artificial Change and Divergence 
The common law treats certain man-made influences on the 
topography of the beach like avulsive events.69 In other words, change 
caused by artificial forces does not affect the pre-existing property line 
and, like avulsive change, causes datum-based lines and property lines to 
diverge.70 The question of whether any artificial forces have caused 
change to the beach in the days, weeks, months, or years prior to the 
surveyor’s arrival on the scene introduces more uncertainty to the 
process of locating the ocean-side boundary. As with the gradual-rapid 
question, the natural-artificial question is one for the finder of fact.71 
The rationale for freezing the line in the face of artificial change is 
simple. Movement of the ocean-side boundary is literally a zero-sum 
game. For every square meter of submerged land that accrues to the state 
by virtue of erosion, the neighboring oceanfront owner loses a square 
meter of dry land. In this context, it would be unwise to have rules that 
allow one party to increase the size of its landholdings through relatively 
low-cost measures such as dumping sand on the beach or building sand-
trapping groins. The fact that the state is one of the parties adds strength 
to this rationale: as a general rule, the law disfavors transfers of 
sovereign property to private parties, insisting on clearly written grants 
indicating clearly expressed intent.72 It is one thing to allow the 
sovereign to transfer land without a grant due to natural changes to the 
beach (as accretion rules do). It would be quite another to allow 
oceanfront owners to intentionally take submerged land from the state 
and convert it to their own, dry-private property.73 
                                                     
69. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 6-236-39 § 6.03 (3rd ed. 2017) [hereinafter § 6.03 
WATERS]. 
70. Id. Of the twenty-one ocean-front states that use datum-based lines, nineteen have rules 
preventing upland owners from gaining title to artificial accretion. See Eagle, supra note 54, at 22–
29. It is hard to imagine, however, that any court today would grant title to new upland created by a 
landowner dumping sand on the beach in front of their home—due to the rapid rate of adding sand 
by dumping, the new upland would also belong to the state under the doctrine of avulsion.  
71. See Kansas v. Meriwether, 182 F. 457, 462 (8th Cir. 1910) (“We have already considered the 
facts disclosed by the findings of the master and the proof and have reached the conclusion that [the 
accretion] was not in fact formed by any artificial devices.”). 
72. See Sax, supra note 14, at 311 (“[T]he law regarding movement at the water’s edge built on 
the general proposition that if land ownership were to change, the change must be pursuant to some 
lawful means for transferring property from one owner to another.”). Courts applied the requirement 
of an explicit, formal transfer with particular strength to land transfers alleged to have been made by 
the crown. Id. at 312. This requirement lives on today in the heart of the public trust doctrine. See 
discussion supra note 64. 
73. See Revell v. People, 52 N.E. 1052, 1057 (Ill. 1898) (“[A]ppellant had no right, by any device 
whatever, to extend his boundary line beyond the water’s edge, and when he did so an injury was 
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Following this rationale, courts that have faced the issue have held 
that a landowner who causes changes to the topography of her 
oceanfront lot is not entitled to the spoils, if any, of that effort.74 At least 
three ocean-fronting states have rules on artificial change that go beyond 
this to cover man-made impacts on the property caused by a third 
party.75 In these states, a landowner is only entitled to natural accretion.76 
Off-property, man-made causes of accretion include activities that 
artificially add material to sediment supply, such as the dredging of a 
channel, as well as those that trap sand on the landowner’s property, 
such as a neighbor’s groin or jetty.77 
As with the question of slow or rapid change, only a court proceeding 
can resolve the question of whether existing beach topography is a 
product of artificial or natural forces. A court will have to answer two 
questions—one purely legal and the other a mixed question of fact and 
law—in order to determine whether an oceanfront owner should gain 
title to newly formed accretion. First, what is the jurisdiction’s definition 
of “artificial”? As noted above, courts might consider landowner-caused 
accretion to be artificial, and otherwise-caused accretion to be natural. 
One court has ruled that accretion caused by on- or off-property sand 
trapping is “artificial,” while accretion caused by off-property sediment 
enhancement is “natural.”78 After it defines “artificial,” the court would 
then have to decide whether the identified artificial force or forces 
actually caused the accretion in question to occur. Coastal 
geomorphology is complex, and expert opinions on the exact causes of 
beach change in a given location will vary. The surveyor is neither 
                                                     
inflicted on the rights of the [S]tate, which might be inquired into and abated in a court of equity on 
the application of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral.”). 
74. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 327 (1973), overruled on other grounds by 
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 371 (1977) (“Where 
accretions to riparian land are caused by conditions created by strangers to the land, the upland 
owner remains the beneficiary thereof.”). 
75. § 6.03 WATERS, supra note 69, at 6-239 (California, Mississippi, and Texas are the three states).  
76. State ex rel. State Land Comm’n v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cty., 900 P.2d 648, 665–66 
(Cal. 1995). 
77. Id. In Luttes v. Texas, 324 S.W.2d 167, 175 (Tex. 1958), the Supreme Court of Texas made it 
clear that Texas courts would only consider “purely natural and imperceptible” accretions as 
“genuine or ‘legal’” accretions. The court also implied that the scope of investigation into the cause 
of accretions would go beyond the location of the property to which accretion attached, referencing 
off-property artificial forces such as “the creation of spoil banks along the Intracoastal Canal and 
Harlingen Ship Channel.” Id. at 175–76. 
78. State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cty., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 763 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
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equipped, nor authorized, to make a determination on the artificial-
natural question. 
C. History and Unknowability 
The unknowability described above is largely a product of the fact 
that a surveyor is only able to capture information about the present. The 
beach, though, is constructed of layers of sand that have accumulated 
over time, like the rings of a tree.79 Each layer is the result of an event 
like a storm, a high tide, or the cycle of a local sediment pattern.80 The 
legal labels attached to the layers—artificial or natural accretion, or 
avulsion—bear on the question of title to the property. (Figure 5 
provides an illustration of layers of change on a sandy beach in South 
Carolina. The drawing presents a greatly simplified version of historical 
change because it shows data on a coarse time-scale, with years between 
MHTL measurements.) 
                                                     
79. E. Robert Thieler et al., Modern Sedimentation on the Shoreface and Inner Continental Shelf 
at Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, U.S.A., 71 J. SEDIMENTARY RES. 958, 962–64 (2001). 
80. Id. 
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Figure 5: 
Lines Showing the Approximate Location of the MHTL at Various 
Times Between 1949 and 1997, Isle of Palms, South Carolina 
 
The map shows nine platted lots, including the two lots that were at issue in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Just above the Lucas lots is a 
small cul-de-sac street, Beachwood East, which the developer built sometime before 
1985. Only a court can establish, for purposes of title, whether the indicated line 
movements were slow or rapid, natural or artificial. 
 
Layers of artificial accretion or avulsion can have the effect of ending 
the oceanfront owner’s nominal and legal status as an oceanfront 
owner.81 The “first” layer of positive avulsion locks the ocean-side 
boundary in place and creates a new oceanfront owner—the state. 
Subsequent accretion belongs to the state, because the state is now the 
oceanfront owner.82 There is no guarantee that the state will remain 
forever as the oceanfront owner. Imagine that the state’s new land 
                                                     
81. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709 
(2010) (“[W]hen a new strip of land has been added to the shore by avulsion, the littoral owner has 
no right to subsequent accretions. Those accretions no longer add to his property, since the property 
abutting the water belongs not to him but to the State.”); L.A. Athletic Club v. City of Santa 
Monica, 147 P.2d 976, 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) (artificial accretion converts oceanfront owner, 
possessing right to future accretions, to ordinary owner whose property boundary is fixed at the line 
where artificial accretion first attached). 
82. See supra note 81. 
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increases through artificial accretion until the mean high-tide line is 
thirty feet seaward of the ocean-side boundary. (Artificial accretion 
causes the two lines to diverge.) If erosion were to erase these gains 
entirely, the state would lose its status as an oceanfront property owner, 
and that status would transfer to the party owning the lot just behind the 
state-private boundary. 
This example only scratches the surface of the real-world complexity 
that would entail in trying to sort out state and private ownership of the 
beach. In the real world, the beach is more like a braid of woven strands 
than a tree of relatively even, marked rings.83 Events do not deposit sand 
in regular, discernible layers. The same event, or combination of events, 
will effect changes to the topography of the beach that vary over small 
distances in terms of rates, degrees, and direction of change.84 Different 
locations within a single parcel of land, for example, might see gains in 
elevation, while other areas might see a decrease. Imagine that a storm 
affected elevations along a lot’s one thousand feet of waterfront in a 
variety of ways. In some spots, the storm raised elevation, causing the 
datum-based line to move seaward, but leaving the property boundary 
where it was before the storm. The state owns this new positive avulsion. 
On other parts of the property, the datum-based line did not change, and 
thus remained identical to the property boundary. As weeks and years 
pass, accretion occurs, adding to both state and landowner property. Or 
does it? It would be impossible to determine as a scientific matter to 
whose property these increases have attached. 
Even assuming that one had the resources to conduct a complete quest 
for the truth of ownership, the needed historical data does not currently 
exist. Labeling beach layers accurately as, for example, rapidly or 
gradually formed, would require hourly or daily observations of beach 
change over a significant period of time.85 
There is one more source of uncertainty wrapped within the layered 
and interwoven ribbons of sand. The presence of the state as owner 
eliminates the quieting effect of time. The oceanfront owner cannot gain 
title to state-owned public trust property, including state-owned positive 
avulsion or artificial accretion, through adverse possession or a similar 
doctrine: adverse possession generally does not apply to divest sovereign 
                                                     
83. DAVIDSON-ARNOTT, supra note 36. 
84. Id. 
85. As noted, this can sometimes be done by taking core samples from the beach. See Luttes v. 
State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 172–73 (Tex. 1958). The geologist’s opinion on whether change occurred 
rapidly or slowly is not, of course, a substitute for a court’s determination as to how the change 
ought to be labelled. 
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owners of title.86 The prohibition on adverse possession against the state 
is consistent with many property rules that disfavor sovereign grants of 
property to private parties.87 
The presence of the state as owner or potential owner of ribbons 
within the beach means that there are no articulable time limits to the 
adequate scope of historical research. The ribbon of positive avulsion 
found at the top of a wide beach may be more than 100 years old, but it 
continues to establish that all sand seaward is public and owned by the 
state. In the hypothetical beach quiet title action, the court will have to 
decide whether there are time limits to the inquiry on historical change.88 
If so, the period would have to be long enough to respect the spirit of 
disfavoring state transfer.89 If not, there would be no possible way to sort 
out ownership.90 
D. Why Rules on Avulsion and Artificial Change Exist 
One way to simplify the process of locating the ocean-side boundary 
would be to eliminate the rules that cause datum-based lines to diverge 
from the property boundary. If the datum-based line were always the 
                                                     
86. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947) (“The Government, which holds its 
interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the 
ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of 
property; [and] Officers of the Government who have no authority at all to dispose of Government 
property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their 
acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.”). Following the Supreme Court’s logic in Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the general ban on adverse possession against the 
government should be absolute with respect to public trust lands, such as submerged or formerly 
submerged sandy beach. In that case, the Court strictly limited intentional transfers of trust lands; 
logic would dictate that the prohibition on unintentional transfers, such as by adverse possession, 
would be even stronger. 
87. While the state can sell or give away land, the common law sets up significant checks on such 
transfers. In a private-to-private sale, for example, deeds are to be construed against the grantor, that 
is, in the light most favorable to the grantee. The common law flips this presumption, holding that 
where a deed is ambiguous, it should be interpreted so as to retain title in the sovereign. See 
Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Env’t, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 684 (N.C. 1995) 
(“The General Assembly has the power to convey such lands, but under the public trust doctrine it 
will be presumed not to have done so.”). 
88. In title disputes between private parties and states concerning potential public trust lands, 
courts regularly go back in time to consider facts from the moment the state came into being and 
before. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1987); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).  
89. And, of course, the proceeding would require data on causes, rates, and directions of beach 
change from the beginning to the end of the period. 
90. The assumption here is that there would be a point in time in the state’s history before any 
measurements of beach change had occurred. In the absence of measurements verifying private 
ownership, a court should not have the power to divest the state of public trust property. 
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property line, then—with some advances in technology—it would be 
possible to know the location of the boundary in real-time and, thus, to 
enforce that boundary. 
It is unlikely, though, that state legislatures or courts will be interested 
in doing away with rules on avulsion and artificial change. Both rules 
are logically integral to the broader doctrine of shoreline boundaries, 
which uses automatic adjustments in the public-private boundary to keep 
submerged lands in public hands while making land that is usually dry 
available for private improvement.91 The general rule that boundaries 
move in harmony with movement of the waterline is an elegant solution 
to the “problem” of unstable real estate, but the rule’s exceptions are 
necessary to protect the interests and expectations created by the general 
rule. While it seems fair for landowners to give up land that has 
gradually become submerged, and vice versa, it does not seem as fair to 
mandate that one party transfer land to another in the wake of either 
sudden changes to their property, or changes that occurred due not to 
acts of nature, but to those of the landowner or other people. 
As noted above, the common law has long included special treatment 
of sovereign land transfers. As Professor Joseph L. Sax carefully 
explained, the evolution of the ambulatory boundary depended upon the 
notion of gradual and imperceptible change.92 The only way for the 
common law to overcome its aversion to the transfer of crown-owned 
submerged land to a private owner was for courts to describe the change 
as being beyond the possibility of proof.93 If the sovereign could prove 
the location of the boundary prior to the accumulation of sediment, then 
the sovereign would be entitled to ownership of the land. But, if the 
accretion had occurred so slowly and over such a long period that 
knowledge of the past eroded and proof became impossible, then it was 
acceptable for the land to be “re-titled” in the name of the oceanfront 
owner.94 Slow and imperceptible is another way of saying that, as far as 
anyone knew, no crown-to-private transfer had ever occurred. 
As Professor Sax pointed out, avulsion—having occurred rapidly over 
a short period of time—made proof of the prior boundary possible.95 
Consistent with general principles of sovereign grants, the King (or 
state) would retain ownership of positive avulsion and, consistent with 
                                                     
91. These automatic adjustments can be thought of as mandated transfers of land from the state to 
the beachfront owner (accretion) or from the owner to the state (erosion). 
92. Sax, supra note 14, at 311–13. 
93. Id. 
94. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 54, at 195. 
95. Sax, supra note 14, at 309–11. 
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the public trust doctrine, would have an obligation to defend its title for 
the benefit of the people.96 Any court or legislature seeking to eliminate 
rules against avulsion would have to justify the departure from general 
principles. Such an act would be, to paraphrase Professor Richard 
Epstein, a taking of public property for private use without just 
compensation.97 
Moreover, while landowners might initially think that the elimination 
of avulsion rules would be beneficial, insofar as it might enhance the 
right to exclude, further thought might convince them otherwise. The 
law of negative avulsion, after all, is favorable to landowners, allowing 
them the opportunity to lawfully reclaim lost land by, for example, 
renourishing the beach. Eliminating the possibility of avulsion would 
mean that sudden and short-lived events, such as storm surges or 
flooding, would shift title frequently and suddenly between oceanfront 
owners and the state.98 What about eliminating only the possibility of 
positive avulsion, while leaving in place rules that protect landowners 
against sudden loss of land? Because such a change would be so one-
sided in favor of landowners, judges or legislators supporting it would 
have difficulty explaining why the change is consistent with their 
obligation to protect state-owned trust property.99 
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine the court or legislature that would 
be willing to sanction private, accretion-causing activities that result in 
mandated transfers of public trust land from the state to private parties. 
As noted in Part II, states define “artificial” in different ways. Some 
states, such as California, use broad definitions that prevent landowners 
from obtaining title to land accreted as a result of artificial forces both 
near and far from the property.100 On the other hand, some states define 
                                                     
96. Id. at 311–13. 
97. Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 417–22 (1987). 
98. See Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951). 
99. Legislation eliminating the state’s future rights in cases of avulsion is tantamount to a transfer 
of state public trust property, specifically, property that was navigable, submerged land prior to the 
avulsive event. The public trust doctrine allows such transfers only in very limited circumstances. 
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455–56 (1892). These restrictions are deeply rooted 
in the Anglo-American legal tradition. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court quoted with 
approbation an opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey:  
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of 
nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the 
waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance 
which never could be long borne by a free people. 
Id. at 456 (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821)). 
100. State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cty., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 
763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
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the term narrowly, to include only accretion-causing acts of the 
landowner herself. Narrowing a broad definition would reduce the scope 
of the inquiry into the geological history of the beach needed to establish 
boundaries. It would not, however, completely eliminate the need for a 
judicial proceeding on the artificial-natural question: for example, a 
landowner could dispute the fact that her actions, say in building a sand-
trapping jetty or groin, were the cause of accretions to her property.101 
One possible way to eliminate the necessity of artificial-accretion 
rules would be to take a different approach to negating the wrongful 
transfer of land from public to private ownership. Specifically, a state 
could opt to regulate the kinds of activities that cause artificial change 
(to prevent it from occurring) rather than claiming title to the results of 
artificial change. South Carolina, for example, bans the construction of 
new seawalls and other erosion control devices.102 Such measures could 
eliminate some causes of artificial accretion, but not all. The South 
Carolina statute does not require owners of existing, pre-1988, structures 
to remove them, and those structures continue to artificially influence 
patterns of accretion and erosion.103 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A BOUNDARY 
Real-time locational uncertainty precludes successful trespass actions 
against members of the public. The location of the boundary on the date 
the landowner wants to enforce her boundary, call it Day 1, cannot be 
known until a judge signs the order in the quiet title action on Day 500 
(or whenever the case ends). After the order is entered, it will be 
possible for a landowner to know that the trespasser was on her property 
on Day 1, but it would have been impossible for the trespasser (or 
anyone else for that matter) to have known this on Day 1. In the absence 
of real-time knowledge, the state cannot prove the elements of criminal 
trespass, which includes the specific intent to cross a known property 
boundary.104 
                                                     
101. See, e.g., Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123, 125–26 (Ill. 1917) (finding that accretion was 
natural, and thus belonged to lakefront property owner, because “the pier constructed by 
[landowner] in 1890 . . . had no appreciable effect in causing accumulations to form on the shore, 
because it did not extend far enough into the water”). 
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(B)(2)(a) (West 2018). 
103. Id. 
104. Note also that a court proceeding will not establish the location of the line on Day 500, but 
on Day 1. Much avulsion and artificial change could have occurred since Day 1. The most 
important word in the last sentence is “could,” because it is the possibility of line divergence that 
creates the need for judicial input. 
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Other than precluding trespass actions, what is the effect of 
acknowledging that, as a matter of law, beach boundaries are 
unenforceable? 
A. A Much Less Problematic Rationale for Public Dry-Sand Access 
Over the past fifty years, courts and legislatures—most notably in 
New Jersey, Florida, Oregon, and Texas—have established public rights 
to use what were assumed to be private, excludable sandy beaches. As 
described below, states have used a variety of theories toward this end. 
These theories have been and remain controversial, in large part because 
courts’ holdings required the expansion of existing public rights, or the 
creation of new public rights, the effect of which was perceived to 
diminish private property rights.105 
For example, in a series of cases, New Jersey courts held that the state 
not only holds fee title to traditional public trust property—land seaward 
of the ocean-side boundary—but also owns something akin to an 
appurtenant easement over some of the state’s dry-sand beaches.106 The 
theory is that the public cannot fully enjoy the state’s part of the beach 
unless members of the public can use the dry sand for the limited 
purposes of resting and walking.107 The public trust appurtenant 
easement is limited in another way as well: it only exists on those 
beaches where it is a necessary appurtenance.108 So, a court would be 
                                                     
Application of the rule of lenity would amplify the difficulties in prosecution of alleged beach 
trespass insofar as it requires courts to resolve uncertainty in favor of the defendant. Note, The New 
Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006). Also, and not a small matter, basic due 
process provides “that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); see 
also State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1982) (overturning beach trespass conviction due to 
legal uncertainty regarding the location of the ocean-side boundary). 
105. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and 
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1380 (1996) (“[J]udicial activists recognize custom-
based property rights as an easy, and cheap, means of vesting a public interest in a valuable 
resource.”); James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Is Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 
337, 372 (2015) (noting that opening beaches via the doctrine of custom put “the rights of every 
property owner on the Oregon coast . . . at stake”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 
VA. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1990) (“Faced by growing environmental, conservationist, and recreational 
demands, for example, state courts have recently begun redefining a variety of property interests to 
increase public or governmental rights, concomitantly shrinking the sphere of private dominion.”). 
106. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 368–70 (N.J. 1984); Van Ness v. 
Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573–74 (N.J. 1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of 
Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
107. “Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be realized unless some 
enjoyment of the dry sand area is also allowed.” Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365. 
108. Id. at 369 (“All we decide here is that private land is not immune from a possible right of 
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less likely to find that the easement exists on private dry-sand beaches 
that are directly adjacent to a state-owned, dry-sand park.109 There is no 
question that this holding required the expansion of existing public trust 
doctrine; in one of its opinions, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
admitted as much, with the majority stating that the doctrine is not meant 
to be “fixed or static,” but rather to “be molded and extended to meet 
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”110 
In Oregon, by contrast, the state’s supreme court has held that all dry-
sand beach in the state is open to public use.111 The court justified its 
holding on the ground that beaches fall into a separate category of real 
property, use of which is governed not by the common law, but by 
uncommon, customary law.112 Applying Blackstone’s six elements of 
custom,113 the court found that the public had enjoyed use of the entire 
beach “as public recreational land according to an unbroken custom 
running back in time as long as the land has been inhabited.”114 On its 
face, the custom rationale for public use sidesteps thorny Takings Clause 
issues that arise when the state alters established property rights; the 
argument, after all, is that there has been no alteration because the rules 
have been in place since time immemorial. Not everyone has bought into 
this “no-change” spin: as Justices Scalia and O’Connor later wrote of the 
Oregon court’s approach, “[t]o say that [the creation of public rights 
                                                     
access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility that 
some of the dry sand may be used by the public incidental to the right of bathing and swimming.” 
(emphasis added)). 
109. The Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized the need for trust-based access because 
“[t]here is no public beach in the Borough of Bay Head.” Id. at 368. 
110. Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54. 
111. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969) (“Strictly construed, 
prescription applies only to the specific tract of land before the court, and doubtful prescription 
cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom, on the other 
hand, can be proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to the 
southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly.”). 
112. Id. at 676–77 (“The other reason which commends the doctrine of custom over that of 
prescription as the principal basis for the decision in this case is the unique nature of the lands in 
question. This case deals solely with the dry-sand area along the Pacific shore, and this land has 
been used by the public as public recreational land according to an unbroken custom running back 
in time as long as the land has been inhabited.”). Professor Bederman critiques this statement of the 
law, arguing that the Oregon court “radically transformed the doctrine of localized community 
practices into a surrogate for the common law of property itself.” Bederman, supra note 105, at 
1421. In other words, the dry-sand beaches of the state were not local, but widespread. 
113. Thornton, 462 P.2d at 677. 
114. Id. at 676–77. 
06 - Eagle.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018 5:45 PM 
2018] BEACH BOUNDARIES 1211 
 
through the custom rationale] raises a serious Fifth Amendment takings 
issue is an understatement.”115 
Courts in other states, such as Florida and Texas, have employed 
more targeted means of opening dry sand to public use, using 
approaches that stress facts pertaining to historical public use on specific 
stretches of beach. The theory of public prescriptive easement is one 
such history-based approach: the law requires proof that the public has 
used the beach for a statutory period, usually for a period lasting 
between ten to twenty years.116 In some ways, public prescription 
appears to be less radical than adding new property to the public trust or 
using custom in a broad-brushed manner: easements apply only to 
limited stretches of beach. In addition, as with any form of prescription 
or adverse possession, the creation of the easement is dependent on a 
showing of neglect on the part of oceanfront landowners.117 The fact that 
oceanfront owners have allowed the public to use the beach without 
intervention for a long period of time might make the formal declaration 
of a right to continue to do so seem like less of a one-sided imposition. 
At the same time, there are reasons why courts might be tougher on 
claims of public—as opposed to private—prescriptive easements.118 For 
example, allowing the creation of a public easement might seem unfair 
to a landowner because she would have faced more difficulty enforcing 
her rights to prevent prescriptive use by large numbers of people than 
she would have had the use been exclusive to one person. In the latter 
situation, it is easy to know whom to sue in a civil trespass action; when 
trespassers are numerous and different every day, this would not be the 
                                                     
115. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
116. 7 JAMES L. BROSS ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 60.03(b)(6)(v)–(vi) (David A. 
Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2006); see also City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 
(Fla. 1974); Concerned Citizens of Brunswick Cty. Taxpayers Ass’n v. Holden Beach Enters., 404 
S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1991); Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012). 
117. One of the justifications for adverse possession doctrine is that the “former title holder 
demonstrated a lack of interest in the land for such a long period of time that she effectively 
acquiesced in the occupation of her land by another.” JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 158 (5th 
ed. 2017). With respect to prescriptive easements, the acquiescence is to use, rather than occupation, 
by another. 
118. See William A. Dossett, Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass’n v. 
Holden Beach Enterprises: Preserving Beach Access Through Public Prescription, 70 N.C. L. REV. 
1289, 1307–08 (1992) (“Because a public easement is less limited in scope and creates a more 
permanent encumbrance than a private easement, courts have placed a greater burden on the 
claimant attempting to prove public prescription.”). 
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case.119 Perhaps for this reason, some states have refused to recognize 
the public prescriptive easement.120 
By contrast, a holding or a new statute premised on real-time 
locational uncertainty simply acknowledges a problem created by 
traditional common law and its recognition of the dynamism of 
shorelines; unlike prior beach access theories, locational uncertainty is 
an argument for inaction, not action. Put another way, it is not a 
normative argument, but a fact. As discussed in the next section, 
recognition of unenforceability does not alter private property rights, it 
simply describes them as they were and are.121 
B. The Effect on Constitutional Challenges 
Counsel for oceanfront owners have been aggressive and creative in 
challenging state actions that facilitate public use of what their clients 
perceive to be private dry sand.122 The principal constitutional basis for 
challenges has been the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.123 In 
recent years, lawyers have attempted to develop theories based on other 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, namely the Due Process Clause of the 
                                                     
119. To be fair to owners of record, adverse possession and prescriptive easement doctrine 
incorporate elements that give those owners the notice and opportunity to assert ownership before 
the adverse claim ripens. SINGER, supra note 117, at 161. One of the elements in adverse 
possession, for example, is the requirement that occupation be exclusive. Id. at 148. This element is 
generally not required for a prescriptive easement; most courts have allowed prescriptive easements 
to ripen where use of the easement had been shared between the owner and the claimant. Id. at 204. 
However, the weakened exclusivity requirement still gives the owner the opportunity to observe and 
identify the claimant. Inherent in the theory of public prescription is the idea that the state is 
claiming the easement on behalf of all, even those who may not yet have visited the property. 
120. See, e.g., Miller v. Grossman Shoes, Inc., 440 A.2d 302, 304–05 (Conn. 1982); Forest Hills 
Gardens Corp. v. Baroth, 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
In a twist on prescription, courts have in some cases found that upland owners have implicitly 
deeded rights of way to the public by allowing people to use the dry sand for lengthy periods. See 
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970), superseded by statute as stated in Scher v. 
Burke, 395 P.3d 680 (Cal. 2017). This is an even more one-sided approach than public prescription; 
it penalizes owners for engaging in the socially desirable behavior of permitting use. 
121. The “reasonable right to exclude” I propose as a replacement for the unenforceable ocean-
side boundary will give landowners more, or certainly clearer, rights than they currently enjoy. See 
infra Part IV. 
122. To get a sense of the number and scope of ongoing challenges, see the current coastal law 
cases filed by Pacific Legal Foundation’s Property Rights project. PAC. LEGAL FOUND., 
https://pacificlegal.org/?s=coastal [https://perma.cc/E3FK-56DY].  
123. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Grupe v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2015); Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012); Brannan v. State, 365 
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. 2010), rev’d, 390 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2013). 
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Fifth Amendment,124 the Fourth Amendment,125 and the First 
Amendment.126 
The absence of a firm right to exclude substantially impairs Fifth 
Amendment claims related to public use of the beach. The Supreme 
Court’s modern regulatory takings jurisprudence, set out in cases such as 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York127 and Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council,128 revolves around a comparison 
between the plaintiff’s property rights before and after the contested 
state action.129 If a plaintiff landowner had no right to exclude 
beforehand, it is difficult to see how state action decreeing public rights 
to use the beach would constitute any change at all, never mind a change 
that would be “functionally equivalent to” a condemnation of the 
property.130 
More importantly, recognition of unenforceability would remove such 
state actions from the Loretto category of “permanent physical 
invasion[s].”131 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,132 
the Supreme Court held that when the state grants a third party the right 
to enter onto a landowner’s property, a taking has occurred, and the state 
must pay compensation to the landowner.133 If the landowner did not 
have the ability to prevent third parties from entering onto the property, 
then the state could authorize non-invasive third-party use of the 
                                                     
124. See Crystal Dunes Owners Ass’n v. City of Destin, No. 11-14595, 2012 WL 1293117, at *2 
(11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2012). 
125. See Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2009). 
126. See Complaint at 10, Goodwin v. Walton Cty., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (2017) (No. 3:16–cv–
364/MCR/CJK). 
127. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
128. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
129. EAGLE, supra note 55, at 858. 
130. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“Although our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, 
and Penn Central) share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are 
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private 
property or ousts the owner from his domain.”). For a discussion of how beach-title uncertainty 
would have affected the Lucas case, see Josh Eagle, Who Owned the Lucas Lots? What “No 
Property” Looks Like on the Beach, 53 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 89 (2018). 
131. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982). 
132. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
133. In Loretto, the City of New York passed an ordinance granting a cable company the right to 
install lines and a box on privately owned apartment buildings. Id. at 423. The Court categorized the 
installations as “permanent,” implicitly defining that term more closely to “indefinite” than to “for a 
very long period of time.” Id. at 426. 
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beach.134 In other words, the possibility of a third-party invasion depends 
upon the existence of an enforceable right to exclude. 
Similarly, the absence of a right to exclude would dramatically reduce 
the chances of success in a Fourth Amendment claim. In at least one 
case, plaintiffs have attempted to frame state action meant to facilitate 
public use of the beach as an unreasonable seizure of property.135 In 
Severance v. Patterson,136 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the plaintiff could plead a Fourth Amendment cause of action 
after the State of Texas ordered her to remove her home from a 
beachfront lot she owned.137 The state’s order was based on the fact that, 
due to negative avulsion resulting from a hurricane, the home had come 
to be located on dry sand that was subject to a public easement.138 
The Fifth Circuit wrote that the plaintiff could prevail under the 
Fourth Amendment if she were able to prove, first, that a seizure had 
occurred and, second, that the seizure was unreasonable.139 The plaintiff 
would have a hard time proving a seizure: per the Fifth Circuit, a seizure 
occurs when the state causes a “meaningful interference with an 
                                                     
134. “The Court has held that physical takings require compensation because of the unique 
burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, 
eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others from entering and using her property—perhaps the 
most fundamental of all property interests.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433; 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S., 
825,831–32 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
135. Plaintiffs have made the takings parallel, Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure 
argument, in at least one other case. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(holding Fourth Amendment cause of action may lie where City published a map that depicted a 
public trail crossing plaintiff’s property.). 
136. 566 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2009). 
137. Id. at 501–02. From the plaintiff’s perspective, there are two differences between a Fifth 
Amendment taking-of-property claim and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure-of-property 
claim. First, while the Takings Clause requires that the government pay compensation for the taking 
of property, the clause does not prevent the government from taking the property after paying for it. 
On the other hand, the Constitution bars unreasonable seizures, with or without compensation. The 
second difference between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims is where the plaintiff may file 
the respective actions. When state regulations are at issue, a plaintiff must file the takings in state 
court, and exhaust her state court remedies, before having the opportunity to be heard in federal 
court (via petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court). Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). My guess is that plaintiffs are motivated more by the latter 
than the former, believing that they will have a better chance with a federal judge, rather than a state 
court judge, weighing the impact of state law on their property. 
138. Texas’ Open Beaches Act requires the State’s General Land Office to “strictly and 
vigorously enforce the prohibition against encroachments on and interferences with the public beach 
easement.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011(c) (West 2018). A court had previously 
determined the existence of a public beach easement on a parcel seaward of the plaintiff’s lot. See 
Severance v. Patterson, 345 S.W. 3d 18, 22 (2010). 
139. Severance, 566 F.3d at 502. 
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individual’s possessory interests in that property.”140 Without a right to 
exclude, there is not a possessory interest, unless possession is shared 
with the world. If possession is shared with the world, there is no 
meaningful interference when the world insists that the landowner not 
monopolize use. 
The most recent type of constitutional claim relating to public use of 
the beach can be found in Goodwin v. Walton County,141 a lawsuit that, 
among other things, challenged a local ordinance that prohibited 
oceanfront owners from placing signs on the beach.142 The Goodwins, 
owners of an oceanfront lot on Florida’s Gulf Coast, claimed that the 
ordinance, passed in June 2016, violated the First Amendment because 
the ordinance prevented them from using signs to express their opinions 
about the extent of their ownership of the beach.143 
Even if the dry sand were incontrovertibly private, the Goodwins 
would have a difficult time proving that the ordinance wrongfully bans 
protected speech. The facts of the case are quite similar to those in City 
of Ladue v. Gilleo,144 in which the city’s ordinance prevented Ms. Gilleo 
from displaying political signs in her front yard. The Supreme Court 
ultimately found in Ms. Gilleo’s favor, holding that signs attached to 
private property represented a discrete category of speech.145 While the 
city was entitled to place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and 
manner of Ms. Gilleo’s speech, it could not wholly ban the distinct and 
irreplaceable category of speech from property.146 The Walton County 
ordinance does not ban speech from property altogether, but only 
prohibits the posting of signs on the dry-sand beach, where signs can 
interfere with emergency vehicles and can become dangerous projectiles 
in high wind conditions.147 The ordinance does not prohibit the 
                                                     
140. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 
141. 248 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (N.D. Fla. 2017). 
142. Complaint, Goodwin v. Walton Cty., Fla., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (N.D. Fla. 2017) (No. 
3:16—cv—364/MCR/CJK). 
143. Id. 
144. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
145. Id. at 57–58. 
146. Id. at 56 (“Displaying a sign from one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct 
from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. 
Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the 
‘speaker.’”). 
147. WALTON COUNTY FLA. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 22, § 22-55 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful 
for any person to place, construct or maintain an obstruction on the beach. Obstructions include, but 
are not limited to, ropes, chains, signs, or fences.”). The county code defines “beach” as “the soft 
sandy portion of land lying seaward of the seawall or the line of permanent dune vegetation.” Id. 
§ 22-02. 
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Goodwins from posting signs on any part of their property landward of 
the vegetation line. 
As with the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, the fact of 
unenforceability substantially alters the nature of a First Amendment 
lawsuit such as the Goodwins’. First, the government has greater leeway 
in restricting speech on public property.148 Put differently, the existence 
of a public right to use the dry sand takes the Goodwin case out of the 
protective framing of City of Ladue. Second, the fact of unenforceability 
highlights the reality that a homeowner cannot be sure she is placing “no 
trespassing” signs on private dry-sand beach, at least not if she ventures 
much past the vegetation line. Due to changing topography and 
divergence, signs placed on private beach today might rest on public 
beach tomorrow. This volatility makes the “no trespassing” warning 
misleading speech that potentially harms the public by coercing beach-
goers off quasi-public property.149 
III. A REASONABLE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
How should the law fill the vacuum created when the right to exclude 
has vanished? Is a replacement right necessary, or is it enough to say the 
landowner has an unenforceable right to exclude? 
From a property theory perspective, it seems necessary to replace the 
unenforceable right to exclude with another right or set of rights. While 
there are many other kinds of property without clear boundaries, such as 
                                                     
148. The beach would likely qualify as a public forum, given its similarity to sidewalks and 
parks, and the fact that speech would not interfere with the primary function of the beach. See 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1143–44 (3d ed. 2006). 
The government cannot ban all speech in a given public forum, but it can “regulate speech . . . in a 
manner that minimizes disruption of a place while still protecting freedom of speech.” Id. at 1131. 
Walton County has advanced the argument that the dry sand at issue in Goodwin is public, on the 
ground that “the public had a right to use the Goodwins’ dry beach property under the doctrine of 
custom.” Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 5, Goodwin v. Walton Cty., Fla., 
248 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (N.D. Fla. 2017) (No. 3:16—cv—364/MCR/CJK). As discussed supra 
section III.A, custom is more problematic than unenforceability as a rationale for public dry-sand 
access. 
149. The ordinance is content neutral insofar as it does not single out speech relating to property 
ownership. Even if the ordinance explicitly prohibited the posting of “no trespassing” signs on dry 
sand seaward of the vegetation line, there is an argument that such a restriction would be permitted 
under the First Amendment on the ground that “no trespassing” signs constitute advocacy of the 
landowner’s illegal claim to ownership of the dry sand. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 148, at 998–
1000. While the signs would not lead to imminent disorder, a court might find that the harm 
produced by using deception to reduce public use of publicly available beach is substantial enough 
to warrant a restriction. 
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the copyright, it is hard to conceptualize property without any 
boundaries at all.150 
As a practical matter, the creation of a well-crafted replacement right 
could provide economic value to landowners, the public, and the state. If 
the right were structured in a way that allowed landowners to protect 
reasonable expectations, many would be better off than they are now.151 
The same would be true for beach-goers. Moreover, if the process of 
crafting the replacement made both parties feel better off than they were 
before, it would reduce conflict and the costs associated with conflict. 
Without a replacement right, landowners will continue to be in the 
unsatisfying position of having the mere right to call the police to 
complain about objectionable public use. To keep the peace, the police 
might respond to the call by shepherding people away from homes, 
where possible, or encouraging them to visit other parts of the beach 
away from the residence or business of the complaining landowner. The 
police, however, will be aware of the difficult issues involved in locating 
the real-time property boundary, and will likely err on the side of public 
use, particularly in tourism-dependent communities.152 
Finally, it is logical to conclude that enforceability must arise 
somewhere. No one would dispute that oceanfront owners can use 
trespass laws to keep others out of residential and commercial structures 
on the property.153 But is there a way to locate a viable exclusion line 
elsewhere on the property, somewhere between the structure and the 
sea? 
                                                     
150. The “fair use” doctrine in copyright law creates a fuzzy boundary, but it does set out rules 
for determining when an actionable trespass has occurred. The unenforceable right to exclude does 
not produce limits on public use of the beach. 
The question of whether a right to exclude is an essential feature of property has been the subject 
of recent scholarship. See Stern, supra note 20, at 1169–70 n.5. The claim here is much smaller: The 
common law of oceanfront boundaries renders those boundaries unenforceable. 
151. Obviously, landowners do not share common expectations about public use of the beach 
seaward of their properties. Given the impossibility of enforcing the boundary through trespass, 
landowners are currently dependent on the subjective judgment of police officers as the arbiters of 
reasonable expectations. 
152. This bias toward public use should not be taken too far, however, regardless of how many 
tourist dollars are at stake. For the same reasons that the landowner cannot use the law to force the 
public from the beach, the state cannot simply claim that the entire beach is a public park, governed 
by the same rules and standards that would apply in any other public park. Doing so would ignore 
the fact that the state’s boundary is also, and equally, unenforceable. This is why Professor Sax 
wrote that “some accommodation must be made between public and private entitlements.” Sax, 
supra note 14, at 356 (emphasis added). 
153. See infra text accompanying notes 174–175. 
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A. The Exclusion Line 
Another way to put this question is: Walking landward from the sea, 
where does the geological history of the beach begin to be immaterial to 
the location of the boundary? Any change that has occurred since the 
state in question came into being would be relevant to locating the 
boundary.154 For example, recall that a thin band of positive avulsion 
eliminates the landowner’s status as an oceanfront owner and makes the 
state the new oceanfront owner. In other words, all accretion that 
accumulates after the avulsive event ends belongs to the state. An 
avulsive ribbon formed on the day after statehood continues to have 
potential relevance to the location of the ocean-side boundary 
indefinitely.155 
As noted above, the reason that the impacts of 150-year-old avulsive 
ribbons continue to matter is that there is no adverse possession of state 
property; and, on account of the public trust doctrine, oceanfront 
property would seem to be least suited to an exception to that rule.156 
One must thus go back to the beginning—the moment after the state or 
territory came into being—to look for evidence of, among other things, 
avulsive ribbons or artificial accretion. It is the possibility that either of 
those changes might have occurred that creates the uncertainty that, in 
turn, makes mens rea and trespass enforcement impossible. 
Any process meant to establish the true public-private boundary 
would obviously be expensive, due to the costs of acquiring historical 
data, expert analysis of those data, and other litigation costs. The 
process, if conducted on a large scale, would also be potentially 
disruptive to real estate markets because title to property would remain 
in limbo until the conclusion of the process. 
                                                     
154. In fact, one could probably go beyond statehood to the time when the state was part of a 
territory. The federal government, as trustee of the territory, would be the beneficiary of any 
positive avulsion or artificial accretion occurring during that time. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 
1, 49 (1894) (“[T]erritories acquired by [C]ongress . . . are held with the object, as soon as their 
population and condition justify it, of being admitted into the Union as states, upon an equal footing 
with the original states in all respects; and the title and dominion of the tide waters, and the lands 
under them, are held by the United States for the benefit of the whole people, and, as this court has 
often said, . . . ‘in trust for the future states.’” (citing Knight v. United Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 
183 (1891))). 
155. It is always possible that the effect of positive avulsion or artificial accretion, that is, the 
establishment of the state as oceanfront owner, might have been voided by subsequent events. For 
example, it is possible that the erosion could erase the avulsive or artificial ribbon, returning 
oceanfront status to the first-row private owner. 
156. See text accompanying supra notes 86–90. 
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It is possible that a state could, in order to soothe markets or to pacify 
unsettled landowners, circumvent the no-quieting-of-sovereign-claims 
problem by expressly transferring or quitclaiming its interest in the 
beach to the first-row private landowner.157 One state has tried to do 
something like this: In 1981, the Maine legislature passed a statute 
giving landowners clear title to public trust lands that landowners had, 
over the years, altered to their own benefit without state permission.158 
The statute did this by freezing the public-private boundary at the 
location of the mean low-tide line on October 1, 1975.159 So, if a 
landowner had, prior to the end of September 1975, filled and 
bulkheaded trust wetlands adjacent to her property, the law would give 
her fee ownership of the filled area. 
On its face, the Maine statute would seem applicable to the beaches as 
well as wetlands.160 However, application of the law to human-caused 
beach change is far more difficult than application to bulkheaded 
wetlands, where the physical boundary would be frozen by the 
bulkheading. On the beach, the property boundary will have moved 
frequently since October 1, 1975, due to erosion, accretion, or avulsion. 
Thanks to these events, a landowner may own more land than she did in 
1975; more importantly, because positive avulsion or artificial accretion 
may have occurred since 1975, it is possible that the state is now the 
oceanfront owner. This possibility creates the need for a quiet title action 
to answer the artificial-natural and avulsion-accretion questions. Thus, it 
would still not be possible to locate the line in real time.161 This same 
reasoning explains why freezing the line as of any date, even the date of 
statehood, does not lead to greater certainty with respect to the current 
location of the line.162 
                                                     
157. See William J. Bussiere, Note, Extinguishing Dried-up Public Trust Rights, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1749, 1781 (2011) (“Courts have been clear that only an express legislative action directed toward a 
particular parcel can remove the impression of public trust rights. . . . Adopting a statewide 
legislative declaration quieting title to previously filled tidelands would . . . reap economic benefits 
for landowners, who could be more certain in their ability to develop property and more confident in 
a price for that property . . . .”). 
158. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1865 (West 2018). 
159. Id. § 1865(2)(A). 
160. The statute defines “filled land” as “portions of the submerged and intertidal lands that have 
been rendered by human activity to be no longer subject to tidal action or below the natural low-
water mark on October 1, 1975.” Id. 
161. Setting the line as it was on October 1, 1975 could have allowed for trespass enforcement on 
that date, had the statute been signed into law on that date and not six years later. The Maine 
legislature wisely chose a date six years prior, thus removing the incentive for landowners to engage 
in last-minute filling projects. 
162. Another way to put this is to say that the line cannot be frozen, except momentarily. The 
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Setting aside the idea of identifying true, permanent right-to-exclude 
lines, or exclusion lines, there are at least two second-best approaches 
that would lead to greater locational certainty, and fewer disputes, over 
the long run. First, one could base the location of the line on the location 
of structures, such as oceanfront homes. A legislature could set the line 
at a fixed distance from the home, say thirty feet.163 On the plus side, this 
approach would protect the privacy interests that form one of the most 
important modern rationales for trespass laws.164 On the minus side, a 
standard distance would not always work well, for example, if the beach 
were less than thirty-feet wide. In such cases, the “no-use-within-X-feet-
from-the-house” rule would prevent any public use of the dry sand.165 
A second approach would be to choose a datum-or science-based line 
that is more stable than the mean high-tide line. The most stable 
candidate, because it is least susceptible to change,166 is the vegetation 
line, that is, the place where plant life begins to be viable.167 Even 
though the vegetation line is more stable than other datum-based lines, it 
would not work well in all situations. Specifically, after a storm has 
destroyed the vegetation on the oceanfront property, the oceanfront 
owner would lose her exclusion line.168 A fair and workable rule would 
perhaps set the property boundary at the vegetation line, and give the 
                                                     
only way to avoid this problem would be to abandon migratory boundary rules in favor of a fixed 
boundary system—for example, one based on Global Positioning System (GPS) data. 
163. In 2017, Walton County, Florida adopted an ordinance protecting “the public’s long-
standing customary use of the dry sand areas of the beaches.” The ordinance set the public use 
boundary at the more seaward of (1) a line located fifteen feet seaward of a permanent habitable 
structure, or (2) a line located fifteen feet seaward of the to the “toe of the dune.” WALTON COUNTY 
FLA. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 23, § 23-2 (2018). 
164. Other rationales for a right to exclude, such as the exclusive right to profit, are not as 
powerful with respect to the dry sand, given that states generally prohibit the construction of 
permanent structures on what is often called the “active beach,” that is, the part of the beach 
affected by tidal forces. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST THROUGH THE NATIONAL COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: HOW COASTAL 
STATES AND TERRITORIES USE NO-BUILD AREAS ALONG OCEAN AND GREAT LAKE SHOREFRONTS 
38 (2012). 
165. It is not clear whether the public would be entitled to use wet-sand areas, or even submerged 
beach, that fell within the thirty-foot zone. 
166. See Morton & Speed, supra note 30, at 1378 (“Of the beach features surveyed, the 
vegetation line is the most stable observable boundary that is controlled by regular flooding 
associated with high water levels.”). 
167. Texas law defines the “line of vegetation” to mean “the extreme seaward boundary of 
natural vegetation which spreads continuously inland.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001(5) 
(West 2018). 
168. Large storms, such as hurricanes, often eradicate dunes and vegetation. 
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landowner a reasonable amount of time following the storm to restore 
vegetation at the pre-storm location. 
The use of a visible line, like a vegetation or wash line, would have 
the enormous benefit of reducing confusion over line location. 
Oceanfront owners, beach-goers, and the police would have little 
problem agreeing on the line location in real time. Adoption of the 
vegetation line, moreover, would create a powerful rationale for 
eliminating rules on avulsion and artificial accretion; building a sand-
trapping groin, for example, could no longer have the potential to 
increase the size of the upland lot.169 
Earlier, this Article argued that it would be difficult for a state to 
eliminate divergence-causing rules on avulsion and artificial accretion. 
These obstacles are much less daunting when the dry sand is explicitly 
under shared public-private ownership. So long as the public can use the 
beach up to the vegetation line, it does not matter who owns the dry sand 
or the reasons why it changes. With respect to artificial accretion, a 
switch to the vegetation line would reduce landowners’ incentive to add 
to a beach in the hope of gaining new land, because all new land would 
be open to public use. The benefits of artificial accretion would accrue 
not only to the landowner, but to the public at large, while the costs of 
the project would be borne solely by the landowner. 
B. Beyond the Exclusion Line 
From the perspective of some oceanfront owners, legislation 
establishing an exclusion line landward of where they perceive its 
current location to be might feel like a loss of property. While the fact of 
unenforceability should prevent this feeling from being remedied in 
court through the Takings Clause, landowners would rightly be 
concerned about the ways in which the new boundary would dent their 
investment-backed expectations.170 Specifically, landowners would 
                                                     
169. It should be noted that Hawai’i, which uses the vegetation line as the public-private boundary, 
has faced issues similar to problems meant to be addressed by rules on artificial accretion. Specifically, 
some landowners in Hawai’i have attempted to move the vegetation line seaward by using 
underground, horizontal irrigation systems. Jan TenBruggencate, Erosion Hasn’t Slowed Shoreline 
Construction, HONOLULU ADVERTISER (Sept. 18, 2006), http://thehonolulu 
advertiser.com/article/2006/sep/18/ln/FP609180340.html [https://perma.cc/7K6F-T3AN]. 
170. Under the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Takings Clause protects 
only reasonable investment-backed expectations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978). Given that every oceanfront lot, by definition, shares a boundary with 
public property, it does not seem reasonable for owners to expect that the view of the beach from 
their residences would not include members of the public. It would be reasonable, however, for 
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understandably be concerned that allowing the public greater and more 
proximate use of the beach could interfere with their ability to use and 
enjoy their beach homes (or businesses) in the way they expected to 
when they purchased them. 
It is possible, though, to structure a revision of oceanfront boundary 
law so that it actually enhances landowners’ ability to protect reasonable 
expectations. The most practical and effective means of doing this would 
be to reconceive of the ocean-side boundary as consisting of two parallel 
lines, the exclusion line and something we can call the “nuisance line.” 
The nuisance line could be located at the land-water interface: 
roughly the point where the sea meets the beach. The oceanfront owner 
would have a right to exclude a member of the public from the area 
seaward of the vegetation line and landward of the nuisance line, but 
only if that person used the beach in a way that unreasonably interfered 
with the landowner’s right to use and enjoy her home or the beach.171 
The oceanfront lot would be reconstructed, in property law terms, as a 
core area of exclusion fortified by an outer ring of lesser, but still 
important, rights. 
The notion of concentric rings of property rights is familiar in the law. 
The most obvious analogy is to the law of private nuisance, which gives 
landowners the right to abatement of, or damages for, off-property 
activities that unreasonably interfere with their ability to use and enjoy 
their property.172 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence divides property into 
areas of varying levels of protection based on the resident’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy in each area.173 
Moreover, the common law of trespass has long incorporated the idea 
that some parts of some properties, namely areas outside of structures, 
could be used by third parties without any harm to the landowner. 
According to Professor Wayne LaFave, “trespass was not a crime at 
                                                     
oceanfront owners to expect that public use would not unreasonably interfere with their ability to 
use and enjoy their residence and the beach. 
171. The right would best be enforced through the criminal code; a provision would fit neatly into 
state trespass codes, which often include different sets of elements for trespasses on different kinds 
of property. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 21.2 (noting special state trespass laws addressing trespasses 
to “railroad property, school property, a medical facility, or a nuclear facility”). 
172. See generally ALLAN BEEVER, THE LAW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE (2013). 
173. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177–78 (1984) (“No single factor determines 
whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be 
free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant. In assessing the degree to which a search 
infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our 
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government 
invasion.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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common law . . . unless it was accompanied by or tended to create a 
breach of the peace.”174 The common law viewed trespass to structures 
as included within the crime of burglary; third-party use of land could be 
prosecuted not under trespass law, but under statutes meant to protect 
public safety.175 
Modern trespass law recognizes this same dichotomy.176 As Professor 
LaFave points out, the Model Penal Code “lists two varieties” of 
criminal trespass statutes, one “having to do only with buildings and 
occupied structures,” and the other addressing areas beyond 
structures.177 Under this latter category of statute, the landowner must 
have given notice against trespass by “fencing the property, posting the 
property, or actual communication with the trespasser.”178 
It is not possible for a landowner to do any of these accurately, that is, 
to provide a member of the public with notice of the location of the 
ocean-side boundary. Given this reality, it seems more than reasonable 
to nevertheless endow oceanfront owners with a functional right that 
they can use to, within reasonable limits, police the beach. 
What would the contours of the reasonable right to exclude look like? 
Importantly, the creation of a private right over public beach use would 
give oceanfront owners rare private standing to police public harms. In 
other words, like the special injury rule in public nuisance law,179 the 
reasonable right to exclude would allow landowners to bring the law to 
bear on harms that ordinarily could only be addressed by a public 
official.180 In communities where public officials are loath to act, 
perhaps because of tourism concerns, such a private right of action might 
be a useful tool for motivating prosecutors.181 
                                                     
174. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 224 n.1 (quoting People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605 (1961)). 
175. See also id. at 231. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 232. 
179. In civil actions, individual members of the public do not ordinarily have standing to collect 
damages for harm to public property. The special injury rule gives standing to a limited subset of 
the public that has suffered harm different in kind from that suffered by the typical citizen. 
180. Unreasonable public use of the beach harms both the oceanfront owner and the public at 
large. Ordinarily, the owner would have no special status with respect to activities on public, or in 
this case, quasi-public, property. The oceanfront owner’s reasonable right to exclude should allow 
the owner to initiate a prosecution by private criminal complaint. For a discussion of issues relating 
to private prosecutions, see Tyler Grove, Are All Prosecutorial Activities Inherently Governmental: 
Applying State Safeguards for Victim-Retained Private Prosecutions to Outsourced Prosecutions, 
40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 991 (2011). 
181. Prosecutors have discretion as to whether or not to prosecute cases initiated by a private 
complaint. Id. at 1007. 
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As for the substantive content of the reasonable right to exclude, 
courts should be able to draw on private nuisance law for clues as to 
what types of activities might impinge on oceanfront owners’ use and 
enjoyment. Typical examples of private nuisances include activities that 
produce noises, smells, pollution, or other harms that have more than a 
de minimis impact on use and enjoyment.182 On the beach, oceanfront 
owners should similarly have the right and power to address issues such 
as loud music and trucks, as well as activities that interfere with use of 
the beach itself such as allowing pets to use the beach as a litter box.183 
CONCLUSION 
Beaches are at the intersection of both land and sea, and of private 
and public property. In the sixteenth century, Hugo Grotius’s treatise on 
the law of the sea, Mare Liberum,184 characterized the ocean as 
fundamentally public. One of the rationales Grotius used to support this 
characterization was that areas of the sea could not practically be marked 
or fenced and were thus not suited to private ownership.185 William 
Blackstone, on the other hand, argued that private, exclusive ownership 
was the key to maximizing the value of dry land.186 Without the 
incentives provided by the right to exclude, people would not invest in 
making land more valuable to society at-large, for example, by plowing 
and planting fields.187 
Given that the beach is part ocean and part land, it is no surprise that 
the legal constructs developed by Grotius and Blackstone do not, in their 
most stringent formulations, fit the beach. The hybrid nature of beaches 
also explains why they are so often the subject of public controversy: 
Parties on both sides of the dispute are prone to want to force the beach 
into one extreme view or the other. One can tell a story about the litany 
of beachfront cases in which the court opinions reach a hybrid result by 
                                                     
182. See BEEVER, supra note 172. 
183. Complaint at 1, 4, Goodwin v. Walton Cty., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (N.D. Fla. 2017) (No. 
3:16—cv—364/MCR/CJK). These activities include setting up tents, allowing pets to defecate on 
the sand, and driving vehicles across the beach. 
184. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1609). 
185. Id. at 31. 
186. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 54, at 195. 
187. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348–50 
(1967). 
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crudely mixing terms and concepts from the law of public and private 
property.188 
But there is no reason why adept policymakers and scholars cannot 
design a novel set of property rules that adequately account for the 
public and private interests that must co-exist within a space that 
changes frequently and often dramatically. The replacement for the 
missing right to exclude should be a tool that landowners can use to 
protect the universal interest in attractive, enjoyable beaches. At the 
same time, the law should not allow for over-enforcement of private 
rights, nor coercion that enables private landowners to portray public 
beach rights as less than they are. Some of the most gratifying benefits 
of moving on from the fiction of an enforceable ocean-side boundary 
will accrue to policymakers, who are now free to design a fair and 
practical set of rules without threat of liability for taking what is neither 
private nor public property. 
                                                     
188. Perhaps the best example of this is in an opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that 
overlaid the public trust doctrine over dry sand owned by a non-profit, while at the same time 
allowing the non-profit owners to charge members of the public a reasonable entry fee. Matthews v. 
Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
